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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
IMPEACHMENT AND REHABILITATION OF
WITNESSES IN MARYLAND*
By HARRY KAUFFMAN**
The modern tendency admitting any evidence logically
probative unless excluded by a clear ground of policy' adds
greater importance to the impeachment and rehabilitation
of witnesses. 2 Much of the untrustworthiness once handled
by exclusion is now handled by impeachment. Statutes
have abolished the common law disqualification of the in-
famous criminal or felon, leaving the crime only to im-
peach, save for convicted perjurers. The modern tendency
is to avoid treating such mental conditions as insanity as a
cause of total incompetency and to admit the person as a
witness, leaving the defect in question to have whatever
weight it deserves as discrediting the witness' power of
observation, recollection, or communication.4 We have had
an almost total abolition of disqualification of witnesses for
interest, and disqualifications of interested witnesses under
dead man's statutes or in like situations have come in for
severe criticism.5
To admit any evidence logically probative of the credi-
bility of a witness unless excluded by a clear ground of
policy is, a priori, desirable. However when the grounds
of policy are such tenuous things as undue consumption of
time, confusion of the jury, unfair surprise, or the working
* The writer wishes to express appreciation to Professor Edmund M.
Morgan of the Harvard Law School for many helpful suggestions. The
views herein expressed are, however, the writer's responsibility alone.
** Of the Cumberland, Md., Bar. A.B., 1939, LL.B., 1942, Harvard Univer-
sity. Second Lieutenant, United States Army (see the preceding footnote).
I See THAYER, A PRE.IMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE (1898) 530, noted
by Morgan and Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence
(1937) 50 Harv. L. Rev. 909, 923. See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, CODE OF
EVIDENCE (1942) 118.2 Thus greater attention must be given to the relevancy, to the weight
of evidence, and to the credibility of witnesses, see Ladd, Credibility Tests
-Current Trends (1940) 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 166, 167.
' 3 JONEs, EVIDENCE (4th Ed., 1938) Sec. 716. Md. Code (1939) Art. 35,
Secs. 1, 9.
' 3 WIGoORE, EVIDENCE (3rd Ed., 1940), Secs. 930, 931.
5 Professor Morgan points out that the fear of perjury on which such
statutes are based is unfounded. See Morgan, The Code o1 Evidence
Proposed by the American Law Institute (1941) 27 A- B. A. J. 587, 588.
Generally for competency as affected by interest, see MORGAN AND MAGuIRE,
CASES ON EVIDENCE (1937) 162-171. (In Maryland a party to a suit in-
volving insane persons, testators, intestate one, etc., is generally incompetent
as to transactions with such persons, Md. Code (1939) Art. 35. Sec. 3.)
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of an illegitimate prejudice against one of the parties, it
becomes apparent that the dividing line will not be one
of sharp demarcation or cleavage. Any extended concern
over the credibility of the witness will usually tend to go
to the periphery or over the brink of the desirable; yet may
be necessary to the fair trial of the parties before the court.
The problem would be difficult even if the law were suc-
cinct and logical, for this is a field replete with rules of
thumb which have hardened into unwieldy and cumber-
some technicalities and kaleidoscopic theorems which be-
cloud and befuddle the real issues.' The problem may at
least be clarified by attempting to suggest what evidence is
logically probative to the credibility of the witness, the
varying grounds of policy on which the exclusion of such
evidence may be based, and the legislative or judicial ap-
plication necessary thereto.
Generally, the problem falls into three categories: A.
Who may be impeached; B. The process of impeachment;
and C. Rehabilitation.
A. WHO MAY BE IMnPEAcHED
It is generally accepted, though qualified in a number of
states by statute, that one may not impeach his own wit-
ness.7  It is law in Maryland today.8  Despite its almost
'Consider for example the rule against the impeachment of one's own
witness, the inflexible rule requiring the witness' writing to be shown to
the witness or read aloud to him before it may be used to impeach him
upon cross-examination, and the limitation of evidence of character to
"reputation in the community, where the witness lives." These will, of
course, be considered later. (It might be here mentioned that most "sins"
are typical, and that Maryland is a typical sinner.) See COMMONWEALTH
FUND COMM£ITTEE, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1927) XVI.
I That is, one cannot attack a witness called by him by evidence tending
to show (a) bad character for veracity, (b) interest, bias, or corruption,
(c) prior inconsistent statements. See 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd Ed.,
1940) Secs. 896-918; Ladd, Impeachment of One's Own Witne8s-New De-
velopments (1936) 4 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 69. It is clear, however, that the
witness can be contradicted by other witnesses called by the party calling
him. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd Ed., 1940) See. 907. There are a few
other exceptions, as for example, when a party must call an attesting
witness. Also the better view would appear to be that a party may reveal
the true character of his own witness at the beginning of the direct ex-
amination, without violating the general rule against impeaching one's own
witness. See People v. Minsky, 227 N. Y. 94, 124 N. E. 126 (1919); Vause
v. U. S., 53 F. (2d) 346 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931), cert. den., 284 U. S. 661 (1931).
8 In Maryland one's own witness may not be impeached:
(a) By bias, interest, corruption or bad character for veracity, Smith v.
Briscoe, 65 Md. 561, 5 A. 334 (1886) ; B. & 0. R. R. Co. v. Black, 107 Md.
1943]
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universal acceptance few rules have been more derided by
modern writers, 9 and some jurists (who nevertheless follow
it).10 It seems clear that the rule should be abolished.
Reasons usually given for the rule are (1) a party vouches
for his witness1' or (2) the party ought not to have the
means to coerce his witness. But "Except in the case of
character witnesses and expert testimony, parties under
the adversary system do not choose any person they might
like to place on the witness stand, but are forced to take
those, good or bad who by fate or chance happen to have
been exposed to the opportunity of observing or hearing
642, 649, 69 A. 439 (1908) (witness is represented by party calling him as
worthy of belief) ; State v. B. & 0. Ry., 117 Md. 280, 83 A. 166 (1912).
(b) But clearly one's own witness may be contradicted by others as to
any material fact, Franklin Bank v. Steam Navigation Co., 11 G. & J. 28,
38, 33 Am. Dec. 687 (Md., 1839) (exception based on a "general rule of
law founded on reason and good sense"); Wolfe v. Hauver, 1 Gill 84, 91
(Md., 1843) ; B. & 0. R. R. Co. v. Black, 107 Md. 642, 643, 69 A. 439 (1908);
Long v. Sweeten, 123 Md. 88, 90 A. 782 (1914).
(c) By prior inconsistent statements unless the witness (1) misled and
surprised, (2) the party calling him or his attorney, or the agent of a
corporation which is a party, (3) as to a material fact or to his prejudice:
Smith v. Briscoe, supra, at 568-570.
Murphy v. State, 120 Md. 229, 233-234, 87 A. 811, Ann. Cas. 1914 B 1117
(1913) (court refused to extend exception of Smith v. Briscoe to statement
made by witness to a prosecuting witness, on the ground it would confuse
and mislead the jury) ; Traveler's Ins. Co. v. Hermann, 154 Md. 171, 179-
180, 140 A. 64 (1927) (agent of corporation, evidence of witness must be to
prejudice of the party calling him) ; Chenoweth v. Balto. Contracting Co.,
177 Md. 1, 15-16, 6 A. (2d) 625 (1939), applies the rule strictly: "If a
party may, without any showing of entrapment or surprise or that the
witness' recollection is faulty or that it needs refreshing, examine his own
witness as to prior inconsistent statements, by the simple device of an-
nouncing that the examination is to refresh the witness' memory, the rule
that a party can not impeach his own witness . . . would be meaningless."
The Chenoweth case is noted (1940) 4 Md. L. Rev. 193. Note the court's
heavy reliance on 2 Pon, PLFADING AND PaACTICE (5th Ed.) Sec. 273, re-
peating the old stodgy formula as it was stated in Patapsco Loan Co. v.
Hobbs, 134 Md. 222, 229, 106 A. 619 (1919).
However by statute since 1939, Md. Code (1939) Art. 35, Sec. 8, the party
calling the adverse party (or agent of the adverse party) may impeach
him as if he had been called by the adverse party.
9 COMmONWEALTH FUND COmmrETEE, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1927) XVI:
"The rule prohibiting the impeachment of one's own witness . . .has no
shadow of good sense in any of its parts ;" 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd Ed.,
1940) Sec. 8c: "The rule against impeaching one's own witness is an irri-
tating relic of worn out tradition. It does as much harm as any one rule
In our system." Dean Ladd, of the University of Iowa Law School, recom-
mends Its abolition, supra, n. 7, 96. The rule is abolished by Rule 106 of
the American Law Institute's Code of Evidence.
10 People v. De Martini, 213 N. Y. 203, 212, 107 N. E. 501, L. R. A. 1915 F
601 (1914).
"I Smith v. Briscoe, 65 Md. 561, 5 A. 334 (1886).
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facts which pertain to the case on trial."' 2  As for the coer-
cion of witnesses, ". . . it is a reason of trifling practical
weight. It cannot appreciably affect an honest and repu-
table witness. The only person whom it could really con-
cern is the disreputable and shifty witness; and what good
reason is there why he should not be exposed."13
The accused in a criminal case may generally be im-
peached in the same fashion as any other witness. 4 The
American Law Institute's Code of Evidence would limit
this so as to prevent impeachment by proof of the convic-
tion of a crime.15
It is clear that every consideration of policy demands a
limit be drawn as to impeachment of impeaching witnesses.
The best solution would seem to be not to draw an arbitrary
line, but to allow the trial judge full discretion.16
B. THE PROCESS OF IMPEACHMENT
The process of affecting the weight to be given to the
witness' testimony is the process of impeachment. When
the witness testifies that a certain fact exists, the inference
is that the fact does exist. Anything that attacks or "ex-
plains'' 7 why we need not accept the inference impeaches.
The ordinary process of attack excludes the likelihood of
the pathological liar being more than a rare bird and as-
sumes that a witness will lie only if he has a reason for
lying. Likewise if a witness is mistaken, it must be as-
sumed there is a reason for his being mistaken. Bias, cor-
ruption, and interest have been established as usual reasons
for lying; assuming the average witness. On the other
hand the witness may be impeached by establishing him
as a witness particularly susceptible to "reasons," for ex-
ample, by proving a bad moral character for veracity. Of
12 Ladd, supra, n. 7, 77.
"83 WiGmORE, EVIDENCE (3rd Ed., 1940) Sec. 899. What of confusion of
main issue with issue of credibility of the witness? See Murphy v. State,
120 Md. 229, 87 A. 811, Ann. Cas. 1914B 1117 (1913).
"3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd Ed., 1940) Sec. 890.
1 Rule 106 (3) of the American Law Institute's Code of Evidence.
'e See 3 WiamoRs, EVMENCE (3rd Ed., 1940) Sec. 894; Wyeth v. Walzl, 43
Md. 426 (1876) (impeachment of impeaching witness allowed).
11 See 3 WiGoMRm, EvIDENCE (3rd Ed., 1940) Sec. 874.
1943]
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course, the biased witness may give truthful testimony
despite a bias, and the "lying scoundrel" may tell the truth,
but the process of impeachment is only concerned with dis-
lodging the witness from his place as the ordinary, honest
witness.
I. The Process of Impeachment by Establishing Reasons
Why the Witness Could Be Lying
A. Bias
There is no doubt cross-examination would be of little
value if a witness could not be freely questioned as to his
motives or bias; and there would be little safety in a judi-
cial proceeding if a biased witness could conclude the ad-
verse party by statements denying his prejudice in the
controversy."' There is, however, a conflict of authority as
to how far inquiry may be pressed.19 In Maryland while
bias or prejudice may be shown,20 the causes of such bias
may not be shown.2  The fact of animosity is enough-the
rightfulness or wrongfulness of that animosity is not an
issue. But the intensity of the feeling and its nature are
relevant and important, and some courts allow inquiry to
be pressed further. The best solution would be to allow
such inquiry in the discretion of the judge.22  There is also
11 3 JolqEs, EVinENCE (4th Ed., 1938) Sec. 828. Particular conduct and
circumstances are, of course, the only means practically available for ef-
fectively demonstrating the existence of the bias.
'9 Vassar v. Railroad Co., 121 Neb. 140, 236 N. W. 189, 74 A. L. R, 1154
(1931).
20 Blessing v. Hape, 8 Md. 31 (1855) (Court reversed judgment on refusal
of trial court to allow witness to be cross-examined as to bias). But note
Regester v. Regester, 104 Md. 1, 6, 64 A. 286 (1906), where court held it no
error to refuse to admit cross-examination as to bias where testimony of
the witness is uncontroverted. See Stockham v. Malcolm, 111 Md. 615, 74
A. 569 (1909) ; Daugherty v. Robinson, 143 Md. 259, 122 A. 124 (1923).
21 Chelton v. State, 45 Md. 564 (1876) (defendant testified the witness
had a grudge against him. The court held it no error to refuse to allow
defendant to state the ground of the grudge, saying "The rule is well
settled that while it is competent to prove that a witness for the state has
a bias or Ill-will against a prisoner .. . it is altogether inadmissible to go
into any inquiry as to the causes or circumstances which have created such
bias .. . innumerable side issues, not pertinent or proper for the considera-
tion of the jury").
Is 3 JoNEs, IDENE; (4th Ed., 1938) Sec. 829; 3 WmMORiF EvIDEWcE (3rd
Ed., 1940) Sec. 951; Alford v. U. S., 282 U. S. 687 (1931). A vast variety
of circumstances may be relevant to prove bias. Certainly, the witness's
occupation, relationship to a party, possible Indictment, etc., are relevant.
3 WIGMUORE, EvIDENcE (3rd Ed., 1940): Sec. 949. Personality and conduct of
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a conflict of authority as to whether a witness must be
questioned as to bias on cross-examination before extrinsic
evidence may be used. Wigmore suggests that it should
not be required.2 3
B. Corruption
It is clear that evidence of corruption may be shown by
extrinsic evidence and freely inquired into on cross-exam-
ination.24 Ordinary evidences of a willingness to swear
falsely include receipt of money for testimony, an offer to
testify for money, an attempt to suborn another witness.
'Conduct indicating a disposition or general scheme to make
false charges is relevant if it indicates a specific corrupt
intention for the case at hand.25
C. Interest
Evidence of interest is also freely admitted to impeach.26
The chief conflict is as to the status of the accomplice or co-
indictee. Such evidence is relevant and should be ad-
mitted.27
II. The Process of Impeachment by Establishing That the
Witness Is Likely to Lie, If Given Reason
Reputation, particular instances of prior conduct, and
the opinion of an observer are all relevant to prove char-
acter;28 but it is questionable "whether general character if
provable is a sufficient barometer for predicting human
the witness are important, ibid, Sec. 950. Blessing v. Hape, supra, n. 20,
involved a "bitter controversy" between the impeaching witness and the
party. In Stockham v. Malcolm, 8upra, n. 20, intensity of feeling was in-
volved (defendant witness had made statement he would spend $50,000, a
sum far in excess of that involved, to beat the plaintiff on the suit).
,83 WIGMORE, EVDENCE (3rd Ed., 1940) Sec. 952. As to Maryland,
quawre.
Il Ibid, Secs. 956-964. Attorney-General v. Hitchcock, 1 Exch. 91 (1847);
Richardson v. State, 90 Md. 109, 44 A. 999 (1899).
25 There is a conflict of authority as to the admissibility of such evidence.
Wigmore strongly recommends that it be admitted. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDECE
(3rd Ed., 1940) Sec. 963.
26 Ibid, Secs. 966-969.
27 Ibid. Erring on the side of caution, the writer, points out in prolixity
that "relevant" and "admissible" are not synonymous in the law of evi-
dence, as witness various relevant expressions, which because of rules of
hearsay, opinion, etc., are ruled inadmissible at present.
28 3 WIGMOR, EvmEzcz (3rd Ed., 1940) Sec. 920.
19431 123
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action in the specific case to justify its use [and] whether
the methods available for its proof are reliable enough to
warrant their application. '29
Authorities who argue for general character testimony
as an impeachment base submit that it necessarily involves
an impairment of the truth-telling capacity and to show
moral degeneration is to show an inevitable degeneration
in veracity, easy to note. But the scoundrel is not neces-
sarily a lying scoundrel,"° and a majority of courts in the
United States, including Maryland, limit character evi-
dence to character for veracity."
Reputation is universally admitted as proof of char-
acter; "reputation" being limited usually to what is gen-
erally said of the witness in the community where the
witness lives.32  It is strongly recommended that evidence
of "reputation" be loosened to include reputation among
business associates, and the like. "In the modern social
life of cities with apartment house living, with limited asso-
ciates in community life . . . the language universally
found in the cases about reputation in a neighborhood rep-
resents the obsolete terminology of an earlier type of
living."33  The constricted interpretation of the word "com-
munity" would not seem to have modern justification.
The opinion of a witness as to another's reputation based
on the witness' personal experiences is generally not ad-
29 Ladd, Techniques and Theory of Gharacter Te8timony (1939) 24 U. of
Iowa L. Rev. 498.30 Ibid, 532-534.
81 Maryland follows the majority, Knight v. House, 29 Md. 194, 199, 96
Am. Dec. 515 (1868); Hoffman v. State, 93 Md. 388, 49 A. 658 (1901);
Evening News Co. v. Bowie, 154 Md. 604, 619, 141 A. 416 (1928) ; 3 WiG-
MoRE, EVDEN CE (3rd Ed., 1940) Sec. 923. Wigmore approves of limiting
character evidence thus, pointing out the uncertain data of reputation evi-
dence, and the desire not to increase the unpleasantness of the witness
box; where the witness' moral character is overemphasized-"No case!
Abuse the opponent's witness." 1 WIGmooE, EvDENcE (3rd Ed., 1940) Sec.
8c. Ladd also points out what is good and what is bad generally In a
person's make-up would depend in a large measure upon the environment
and the attitudes of the particular person judging the character, whereas
all persons are responsive in singling out qualities related to truthfulness.
See Ladd, supra, n. 2, 172.32 Vernon v. Tucker, 30 Md. 456, 463 (1869) ; Bonaparte v. Thayer, 95 Md.
548, 560, 52 A. 496 (1902). (reputation of witness among his business asso-
ciates and not his general associates is not admissible to prove character).
88 Ladd, supra, n. 29, 514.'
(VOL. VII
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mitted.3 4  Both Wigmore and Ladd strongly recommend
the adoption of opinion evidence to prove character,35 "the
general belief in the untrustworthiness of personal opinion
as proof of character is the only rational ground for its ex-
clusion, and this may be seriously questioned . . . the per-
sonal judgment of a qualified and reliable witness ought to
be better than reputation of character based upon the hear-
say interchange of gossip and scandal in the community." 6
Generally the reputation of a woman for chastity is not
admitted but when the woman is the prosecutrix in a
charge of a sex-offense the testimony is especially relevant
to impeach and should be admitted,8 7 and this better rule
may obtain in Maryland, although the cases are confusing.
All witnesses may usually be cross-examined as to their
general history to put them in their proper setting. 8
May particular instances of prior conduct be admitted
to prove moral character and consequently impeach? The
writer has examined this question and must admit his lack
of certainty as to the law in Maryland on this question.
The weight of authority in other states 9 seems to hold
that particular acts of misconduct on the part of the wit-
ness may be inquired into upon cross-examination by the
party seeking to impeach, but that such prior instances of
84 However, after the impeaching witness has testified as the general
reputation for veracity of the witness in the community he may be asked
"whether from that reputation he would believe him on oath in a matter
In which he was interested," Knight v. House, 29 Md. 194, 199, 96 Am. Dec.
515 (1868). The Court said in the same opinion (p. 199) that the effect of
the question is not to elicit from the witness a mere opinion, but its object
is to test the extent or degree of badness of the general reputation of the
person impeached.
11 See 7 WIGMORE, EVnENC (3rd Ed., 1940) Sec. 1986.
"Ladd, supra, n. 33, 511.
8Brown v. State, 72 Md. 468, 475, 20 A. 186 (1890) ; Kremis v. Kremis,
163 Md. 223, 231, 161 A. 255 (1932). If the prosecutrix testifies that there
was no consent, the problem is whether from the testimony as to her
chastity lack of veracity may be inferred. Wigmore, at Sec. 979, cites
reason why there may very well be a reasonable inference.
88 Alford v. U. S., 282 U. S. 687 (1931) (history of the witness usually
includes abode, occupation, environment and associations. Of necessity,
laxity in examination must be allowed as it is difficult to ascertain in
advance what answers will be forthcoming).
* 3 WIGMORE, EvIDExCE (3rd Ed., 1940) Sees. 982-989. As to cross-ex-
amination a few courts say when the witness denies the misconduct, he
may not be questioned further and the witness' evidence may not be con-
tradicted. See 3 JoNEs, EVIDENCE (4th Ed., 1938) Sec. 839. On Privilege,
see Ibid, Secs. 830-832.
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misconduct may not be shown by extrinsic testimony since
there will tend to be a confusion of issues between the ma-
terial issue and the issue of the credibility of the witness,
and also because it tends to catch the witness by unfair
surprise.
Moreover, even when these particular acts of miscon-
duct are sought to be brought out by cross-examination a
question of the scope of cross-examination arises, particu-
larly as to what cross-examination is relevant to the wit-
ness' credibility. The inclination in most American courts
seems to be to leave the question of the scope of cross-
examination to the court and although, logically, the court
should not be allowed to admit irrelevant material, that is,
any kind of misconduct but only misconduct relating to
veracity, discretion seems to have been invested in the
court, both as to relevancy and policy. Most courts would
seem to hold that there is no privilege in the witness to
refuse to answer questions which would tend to disgrace
or degrade him. Of course, this does not include that kind
of disgraceful answer which might make him subject to
criminal prosecution, in which case he may invoke his
privilege against self-incrimination, subject to the rules
which govern that privilege. 9a
There obtains to these rules a clear cut exception in the
admissibility of extrinsic evidence by proof of prior con-
viction of crime; however, this exception would seem to
be more than justified by the fact that the record easily
discloses the conduct.
The situation in Maryland, however, is considerably
obfuscated. There is decisive authority to the effect that
extrinsic evidence of particular acts of misconduct is not
admissible to impeach the witness.4 0
"I See Md. Code (1939) Art. 27, Sec. 27, on bribery; Art. 27, Sec. 427, on
lotteries; Art. 27, See. 304, on gaming and betting; Art. 27, Sec. 43, on con-
spiring to commit above crimes, a series of statutes denying witnesses the
right to exercise the privilege of self-incrimination in those crimes but con-
taining an "Immunity" provision, similar to the I. C. C. clause, providing
that if so compelled to testify they may not be prosecuted for crimes thus
revealed.
40 Richardson v. State, 103 Me. 112, 63 A. 317 (1906) ; Rau v. State, 133
Md. 613, 616, 105 A. 867 (1919) (as to the third exception) ; Meno v. State,
117 Md. 435, 83 A. 759 (1912).
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Does the privilege against disgraceful answers exist in
Maryland? The later cases do not seem to attack the ques-
tion from this angle, but two early cases4 1 indicate that
such privilege does exist on the part of the witness, except
as to matters which form a material part of the issue.
Once privilege would seem to be established, then the
question of the scope of cross-examination would seem to
be uncalled for; yet there are a few cases in Maryland
which undoubtedly discuss the question of particular in-
stances of misconduct as testimonial impeachment from
the viewpoint of the scope of cross-examination and the
relevancy of that scope.4 2  Thus we will find expressions
stating that even by cross-examination questions of prior
instances of lack of chastity will not be allowed, appar-
ently on the basis of relevancy, seeking to confine the cross-
examination to veracity character rather than chastity
character or any other type of character.a Of course, it
may be possible to reconcile them by stating that the privi-
lege against disgracing answers is a privilege of the witness
and since it was not asserted by the witness in these cases
last mentioned, then the court was back in its discretionary
field. This is a reconciliation of a sort, and if true, it would
seem to leave the law in Maryland at this stage: Particular
acts of misconduct may not be shown by extrinsic testi-
mony, except where it may be shown by a prior conviction
of crime. As to such acts sought to be elicited on cross-
examination if the witness chooses to assert it, he has the
41 Merluzzi v. Gleeson, 59 Md. 214 (1882); Smith v. State, 64 Md. 25, 20
A. 1026 (1885). Also see 2 POE, PLEADING AND PRACTICE (5th Ed., 1925)
Sees. 277, 278, 278a.
11 Shartzer v. State, 63 Md. 149 (1885) ; Brown v. State, 72 Md. 468, 20
A. 186 (1890) ; Avery v. State, 121 Md. 229, 237, 88 A. 148 (1913) ; Hoffman
v. State, 93 Md. 388, 49 A. 658 (1901) ; Annarina v. Boland, 136 Md. 365,
III A. 84 (1920).
Rau v. State, 133 Md. 613, 616, 105 A. 867 (1919) (a decision which some-
times seems to confuse the question of testimonial impeachment of char-
acter by showing disgraceful conduct and testimonial impeachment of
character by showing habitual false charges as evidence of corruption).
'1 Cases supra, n. 42. To be sure, the accused in a criminal case may, by
witnesses introduced to show his good reputation and character, enormously
widen the scope of his impeachment. Evidence of good character, except
for rehabilitation purposes, is confined to this instance for general evi-
dential purposes, though it may sometimes have a particularly pertinent
aspect, e. g., in a slander suit.
1943]
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privilege of not answering questions of his prior miscon-
duct which might tend to disgrace or degrade him, and, of
course, this same privilege obtains if the question of self-
incrimination arises. Of course, this privilege is repudiated
as to all matters relevant to the issue, but applies for mat-
ters affecting credibility of the witness. In the event the
witness does not assert his privilege the court may, upon
objection or on his own motion, assert discretion over the
scope of cross-examination-apparently tending in Mary-
land to admit only such misconduct as indicates a lack of
veracity.4
Of course in all cases of admission of an act of prior dis-
graceful conduct, character is attempted to be inferred
from a single act. Dean Ladd feels that the admission of
such proof to test credibility in its broad application would
find little support upon psychological theories because as
an isolated event it would not be sufficiently representative
to become the basis of establishing a personality type; and
he suggests that the principle if justifiable at all must rest
on the assumption that the person convicted had committed
other crimes of which he had not been convicted, or that
the crime evidenced a course of conduct. 5 However it
would seem that the process of impeachment is not espe-
cially concerned in establishing a personality type, but in
merely establishing a basis from which a personality type
could be inferred. A conviction of a crime involving ver-
acity is certainly more serious than proof of an ordinary
lie, and when established would seem to be in most cases
strong evidence of a personality type-at least strong
enough to dislodge the witness from his position as the
ordinary, honest witness. Ladd's position however points
out boldly the necessity of admitting only those crimes
relating to veracity, as these will stand the circuitous route
of impeachment (from inference to inference) with greater
strength."
1" Cases supra, n. 42. See also infra, n. 50. Note the possible exceptions
as to sex offenses prosecutrix referred to supra, n. 37.
Ladd, supra, n. 2, 177-8.
"To summarize, prior disgraceful conduct concerning veracity infers a
bad moral character for veracity, which infers a likelihood of falsehood in
the particular case, if the witness is given reason.
128 [VOL. VII
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It is thus difficult but necessary to limit prior disgrace-
ful conduct including conviction of crime to that conduct
involving veracity. As noted, most courts freely allow in-
quiring into prior disgraceful conduct; but convictions of
crime are usually limited to felonies or infamous crimes by
inference of statute,47 or crimen falsi1s In Maryland by
statute any "infamous" crime may be shown,49 but this has
been interpreted by courts so that only crimes involving
veracity, and not necessarily infamous, may be shown. 50
1 
7 JONES, EVIDENCE (4th Ed., 1938) Sec. 716.
,8 See Ladd, supra, n. 2, 179 (crimen falsi are usually defined as crimes
injurious to the administration of justice by the introduction of falsehood
and fraud).
,9 Md. Code (1939) Art. 35, Sec. 9 (first enacted Md. Laws 1864, Ch. 109,
Sec. 5, sub-see. 1).
50 Prior to Nelson v. Seiler, 154 Md. 63, 139 A. 564 (1927), witnesses had
been impeached by proof of a former conviction of crime without reference
to its nature, McLaughlin v. Mencke, 80 Md. 83, 30 A. 603 (1894) (witness
could be asked whether he had ever been in jail and why he had been
sent there). Semble: Annarina v. Boland, 136 Md. 365, 381, 111 A. 84
(1920). In Wilson Amusement Co. v. Spangler, 143 Md. 98, 121 A. 851
(1923), the witness was alllowed to be questioned as to a conviction for
assault, which was the issue in the case, on the ground it affected his
credibility as a witness. Logically a conviction of assault would have no
relation to veracity and credibility, and in this case is undoubtedly highly
prejudicial. If such testimony is to be admitted it should not be admitted
as impeaching evidence. But the conviction must not be so distant in time
as to be irrelevant; Simond v. State, 127 Md. 29, 95 A. 1073 (1915) (con-
viction 10 years previously of drunkenness immaterial and properly ex-
cluded).
In Nelson v. Seller, the Maryland Court analyzed the problem much
more completely than at any other time, stating, (154 Md. 69) "Criminal
law and criminal procedure are made use of for the enforcement of a large
volume of mere regulations . . . wholly without relation to any moral
qualities; and while it may have been less appparent in times past, it is
now at least uneschpable that some discrimination must be made when the
courts come to receive evidence of violations to impeach the credibility of
a witness. It is not required that the evidence be restricted to infamous
crimes or those involving moral turpitude on the one hand, but on the
other, the purpose of the admission, to impeach credibility, must impose
some limits . . . the trial court must exercise discretion . . . decision will
not be interfered with on appeal except when the evidence is clearly irrele-
vant." (In Nelson v. Seiler the convictions involved were speeding and
driving without a license.) The Court of Appeals held the lower court was
in error by overruling objections to questions put Involving these convic-
tions. Wigmore contends that the ruling was unsound and impractical as
a conviction for traffic offenses discredits any driver testifying about his
driving. 3 WIOmORE, EVIDENCE (3rd Ed., 1940) See. 987. But this does
not seem necessarily so. Certainly it has no connection with veracity
directly, through moral character for veracity. (If it is inconsistent with
testimony on the stand, of course it could not be admitted for truth of the
matter asserted as it would be hearsay.) In any event the Seiler case
indicates that conviction of crime must relate to the character of veracity
before they can be used to impeach, and as such it is law today. See Gen.
Exch. Ins. Corp. v. Sherby, 165 Md. 1, 165 A. 809 (1933) (conviction of
reckless driving held properly excluded). In Green v. State, 161 Md. 75,
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It is difficult to classify crimes relating to veracity. Per-
sonal crimes of murder, assault and mayhem show a vicious
disposition but not necessarily a dishonest one."' On the
other hand robbery, larceny, and burglary and such, dis-
close a disregard for the rights of others which might rea-
sonably be expected to express itself in giving false testi-
mony whenever it would be to the advantage of the wit-
ness, and should be admitted although they do not show a
propensity to falsify. 52 And, of course, crimen falsi should
be admitted."
The proposed Code of Evidence suggests that conviction
of crime to impeach be limited to those involving "dishon-
esty or false statement."54  This evidently intends to ex-
clude murder, and similar personal crimes, as not being
"dishonest;" and would include robbery, according to
Ladd's analysis.55
As we have noted,56 the accused in a criminal case is
ordinarily subject to impeachment like any other witness.
The Proposed Code in Rule 106 states that the accused
should not be examined or evidence admitted as to facts
proving conviction or commission of a crime unless he has
first introduced evidence of good character to suppport his
credibility. This is based chiefly upon two reasons, one
the general belief that evidence of conviction of an accused,
though received only as affecting his credibility as a wit-
ness, is constantly misused by juries to prejudice him on
155 A. 164 (1931) the court allowed the witness to be Impeached by a con-
viction of rape in the same transaction as involved in the principal case;
the court seemed to put impeachment by this showing on bias or motive.
Query if a conviction of rape is a sufficient foundation for impeachment of
veracity.
It is clear that the discretion of the trial judge carries great weight.
In addition to the Seiler case, note Burgess v. State, 161 Md. 162, 155 A.
153, 75 A. L. R. 1471 (1931) (quoted in part 3 WIGMORE, RVIDENCE (3rd
Ed., 1940) Sec. 980. 542-3, and O'Dell v. Barrett, 163 Md. 342, 163 A. 191
(1932).
51 S2upra, n. 2, 180.5 2 Ibid.
33 Ibid, 179-180. In Maryland the perjurer is regarded as so unreliable
he is incompetent. Md. Code (1939) Art. 35, See. 1.54 AmER. LAW INST., CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942) Rule 106.
51 The author does not wish to suggest that murder is honest. Dean
Ladd was, of course, one of the advisers of the American Law Institute's
Proposed Code of Evidence.
01 Supra, circa n. 14.
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the merits,"7 and, two, since Rule 201 of the Code permits
the judge and counsel to comment on the failure of the
accused to take the stand it is only fair that prejudicial im-
peachment process be limited. s What it boils down to, of
course, is the desirability of obtaining the accused's evi-
dence-"Does it mean more to have the accused testify
than it does to keep him from the stand because of a fear
of prejudicial cross-examination?" 9  Rule 106, paragraph
3 of the Code, of course, is based on the answer "yes" to this
question.
III. The Process of Impeachment by Showing that the
Witness Is Now Mistaken on the Stand or Has Been
Mistaken Previously-(Prior Inconsistent
or Contradictory Statements).
A prior inconsistent statement may be due to any of a
number of characteristics (some already discussed)-a
moral disposition to lie, faulty memory, bias, corruption,
and so forth.
To obviate possible unfair surprise almost all courts re-
quire a proper foundation; the impeaching litigant to ask
the witness while on the stand under cross-examination
57 It is said that the use of such evidence is the chief reason for the
failure of the accused to take the stand. Note Arthur Train in "The
Bloodhound" (from the "Tut, Tut! Mr. Tutt" stories, Charles Scribner's
Sons, New York, 1920) at 21 "Paddy Mooney felt his way round behind the
jury box and to the witness chair. He knew that he was innocent but he
knew that he was going to be pilloried on cross-examination and utterly dis-
credited. He was an ex-convict. That would be enough to send him up
again. But unless he took the stand and denied the weapon was his, the
jury ...would have to convict him ..."
68 In Maryland the accused's failure to testify creates no presumption
against him. Md. Code (1939) Art. 35, Sec. 4. Likewise it is not evidence
in a civil suit involving the same transaction, Art. 35, Sec. 7. See further,
Note, Privilege of Counsel to Explain Traverser's Failure to Testify
(1937) 2 Md. L. Rev. 79.
The effect of the new rules of practice and procedure of the Court of
Appeals in Maryland, which became effective September 1, 1941, as to the
right to comment on the failure of the witness to take the stand has not
yet been fully determined, but It would seem that such comment under
the language of these rules, would not yet seem proper. Note the fact
that the American Law Institute's Proposed Evidence Code permits com-
ment on the refusal to testify, Sec. 201(3).
5, Ladd, supra, n. 2, 184-91.
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whether he made the supposed contradictory statementgo
The purpose of the preliminary question is to warn the wit-
ness, but American courts have treated it not as a warning
but as an inherent requisite. The result is that unless an
arbitrary formula is carefully followed the opportunity to
impeach may be lost, even though the warning is ade-
quate;" unless the witness remains present and the court
allows him to be recalled.2
If the prior contradictory statement is in a writing most
courts hold that the witness need not answer on cross-
examination any question as to the contents of the writing
(written or signed by him), unless it is produced and shown
to him, or read aloud to him.68  "This view . . .hampers
cross-examination by protecting the shifty witness, its abo-
lition harms no honest witness or the party who presents
him.,6 4
If a party litigant is a witness, his prior contradictory
statements are admissible to impeach, and are also admissi-
60 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd Ed., 1940) See. 1025; Whiteford v. Burck-
myer, 1 Gill 127, 139-146 (Md., 1843) ; 2 POE, PLEADING AND PRACTICE (5th
Ed., 1925) Sec. 280.
613 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd Ed., 1940) Sec. 1029. See Whiteford v.
Burckmyer, supra, n. 60, Higgins v. Carlton, 28 Md. 115, 92 Am. Dec. 666
(1868) (it is not sufficient to direct his attention to date, names, and other
attendant circumstances; the witness must be asked whether or not he has
said or declared that which is intended to be proved) ; Peterson v. State,
83 Md. 194, 34 A. 834 (1896); Conrades v. Heller, 119 Md. 448, 87 A. 28
(1913) ("Didn't you tell me, Mr. Bonty, that this paper was signed before
you got there" held not sufficient foundation to contradict as it didn't include
"time, place, where, persons to whom alleged contradictory statements were
made").
82 3 JONEs, EVIDENCE (4th Ed., 1938) Sec. 846.
63 This is, of course, the doctrine of Queen's Case, 2 B. & B. 284 (1820).
It is followed in Maryland, Whisner v. Whisner, 122 Md. 195, 89 A. 393
(1914). If the writing Is a deposition, however, Queen's Case is not fol-
lowed, Ecker v. McAllister, 45 Md. 290, 304 (1876).
64 Amer. Law Inst., Code of Evidence (1942) 62, Rule 106, which rejects
the doctrine of Queen's Case, but permits the judge in his discretion to
exclude evidence of a written or oral statement unless the witness was so
examined while testifying as to give him an opportunity to deny or explain
the statement.
Note, as pointed out by Professor Morgan, supra, n. 5, 589, the rule of
the Queen's Case (and Rule 106 (2) of the Code) apply only to the conduct
of the cross-examination. They have nothing to do with the introduction
of the writing as extrinsic evidence of a prior contradictory statement, or
with the rule which requires the production of an original writing as the
best evidence of Its content.
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ble as admissions,65 hence it would be erroneous to require
warning.66
If the witness cannot remember making the prior in-
consistent statement when questioned as to it on cross-
examination, there is a split of authority as to whether he
may be impeached by it; Maryland allows proof of the con-
tradictory or inconsistent statement to impeach if the wit-
ness cannot remember.67
A prior inconsistent statement should not be admissible
as to a collateral matter-which under the better view is
any fact not relevant to some issue in the case or pleadings,
or a fact admissible to discredit the witness, as to bias, cor-
ruption, lack of skill, knowledge, and so forth.6
65 3 JONES, EVIDENCE (4th Ed., 1938) Sec. 846a, 3 WIGmoE, EVIDENCE (3rd
Ed., 1940) Sec. 1048, Bartlett and Robbins v. Wilbur, 53 Md. 485, 497-498
(1880). Inconsistent statements can impeach only, Foble v. Knefely, 176
Md. 474, 6 A. (2nd) 48, 122 A. L. R. 831 (1939), such impeaching effect
having no independent probative testimonial effect or value, Mason v.
Poulson, 43 Md. 161, 177 (1875). Wigmore suggests such evidence be
admissible for the truth of the matter asserted, as the witness is present
and subject to cross-examination, but admits this is against the holding of
all the courts. 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd Ed., 1940) Sec. 1018.
:113 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE (3rd Ed., 1940) Sec. 1051.
7 Leister v. State, 136 Md. 518, 523, 111 A. 78 (1920).
68 Wigmore bases the exclusion of collateral matter on auxiliary policy-
danger of unfair surprise and confusion of issues in collateral matter.
Thus on principle Wigmore would not object to cross-examination as to
self-contradiction on collateral matters. 3 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE (3rd Ed.,
1940) Secs. 1020-1023.
See Hale, Impeachmnent of Witnesses by Prior Inconsistent Statements
(1937) 10 So. Cal. L. Rev. 135, 162-164.
There is probably such a rule limiting inconsistent statements as to
collateral matters in Maryland but it is somewhat confused. In 11un-
shower v. State, 55 Md. 11, 22, 39 Am. Rep. 414 (1880); and Sloan v.
Edwards, 61 Md. 89 (1883) there is talk of limiting cross-examination as
to irrelevant contradictions but there is no inconsistent statement. In
Pindell v. Rubinstein, 139 Md. 567, 576, 115 A. 859 (1921), the inconsistent
statement could not have been allowed as direct testimony because it was
hearsay and therefore the court said it could not be allowed to impeach;
by authority of Sloan v. Edwards. (At 139 Md. 576: "They were only
hearsay, and therefore irrelevant and incompetent"). This reasoning seems
erroneous since the statement was not offered for the truth of the matter
asserted, but to impeach only. In Quimby v. Greenhawk, 166 Md. 335, 344-
345, 171 A. 59 (1934), evidence contradicting the statement of a witness
that she had not been paid for services rendered decedent (trial involved
validity of a will) was held properly excluded as involving an attempt to
impeach witness on a collateral and immaterial matter, citing as authority
City Pass. Ry. Co. v. Tanner, 90 Md. 315, 320, 45 A. 188 (1900), which, in
turn, as to a point which could involve inconsistent statements cites as the
only Maryland authority Sloan v. Edwards. For general statements as to
the admissibility of evidence to impeach as not being collateral, see Wise
v. Ackerman, 76 Md. 375, 394, 25 A. 424 (1892) ; and Mahan v. State, 172
Md. 373, 380, 191 A. 575 (1937).
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IV. The Process of Impeachment by Giving Reasons Why
the Honest Witness May Be Mistaken, Attacking the
Witness' Memory or Power of Observation
Generally the witness' mental capacity to recollect, ob-
serve, and narrate can be tested by cross-examination or
extrinsic evidence.69  On cross-examination (and perhaps
somewhat by extrinsic evidence) common tests of memory
and observation are, of course, allowed.69a However, usu-
ally one cannot introduce extrinsic evidence to prove the
witness had a poor grade memory.70
C. REHABILITATION
Rehabilitation is the process of restoring the impeached
witness to his standing as the ordinary, honest witness; and
ordinarily one may not introduce testimony of the witness'
good character for veracity, or accurate perception until
the witness has been impeached.71
All courts agree a direct impeachment of moral char-
acter opens the way to rehabilitation by evidence of good
character.7 2  It is more difficult to explain rehabilitation by
good character evidence when the witness has been im-
893 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd Ed., 1940) Sees. 931, 932. Intoxication is
admissible if faculties are affected, Ibid, Sec. 933.
69, Ibd, Secs. 993, 994, 995.
7 oIbid, Sec. 935. The American Law Institute's Code of Evidence follows
the minority view, and also would allow evidence of exceptional mental
faculties (see Code, page 120). Wigmore feels the method of proof at
present is not reliable enough to warrant admission of such evidence. See
3 WIGMOR, EVIDENCE (3rd Ed., 1940) Sees. 997, 998. However, he does
recommend that any diseased impairment of testimonial powers, including
nymphomania derived from whatever source, if ascertainable with accuracy,
should be considered. See Ibid, Secs. 934, 935.
71 The Code of Evidence proposes that there should be admitted evidence of
honesty and veracity or exceptional mental powers, or any conduct of his
having substantial value bearing on his credibility as a witness without
the necessity of impeachment of the witness, subject of course to the rules
limiting testimony generally, and to the direction of the judge to exclude
admissible evidence (Rule 403). See Rule 106 and comments following:
Of course good character for veracity is relevant to indicate the probability
of truth telling as bad character for veracity is to indicate the probability
of the contrary. But until his character is brought into question good
character should be assumed to exist. See 4 WIGMORE EVIDENCE (3rd
Ed., 1940) Sec. 1104. The theory of the Code must be that good char-
acter evidence increases the value of the testimony and is of probative
value. (Raises witness above ordinary witness.)
724 WIO oME, EVIDENCE (3rd Ed., 1940) Se. 1105. See Vernon v. Tucker,
30 Md. 456 (1869) ; Davis v. State, 38 Md. 15, 49 (1878) ; PoE, 8upra, n. 60,
Sec. 286
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peached by a conviction of a crime; as testimony of good
repute is not enough to explain the impeachment or the
crime base away, but practically it is important and is al-
lowed by most courts.7" Where the witness is impeached
by bias or interest, good character does little to refute the
inference raised, and should not be allowed.
74
As noted, prior inconsistent statements may involve the
moral disposition to lie, erroneous memory, bias, and so
forth; rehabilitation by evidence of good character is rele-
vant only if the moral disposition to lie is involved and
"considering the usual remoteness of the inference as to
moral character, and the minor value of reputation-evi-
dence in modern times, it is not worthwhile to cumber the
trial with it for so trifling a use.''75 However, Maryland
permits it. 76
Rehabilitation by prior consistent statements is gener-
ally allowed, usually after impeachment by prior contra-
dictory statements.77 But prior consistent statements would
only seem to indicate volubility or verbosity and not ver-
acity.78  In Maryland it would seem that consistent state-
ments may be admitted after impeachment of any sort, but
there is no reason for such a rule, for the probative value
of such rehabilitation is usually remote, and involves con-
fusion of issues and undue consumption of time.79
714 Wiooas, EVIDENCE (3rd Ed., 1940) Sec. 1106. The crime itself may
not be gone into, but Wigmore suggests that proof of extenuating circum-
stances should be admitted. Ibid, Sec. 1117. See Vernon v. Tucker, 30
Md. 456 (1869) ; Donnelly v. Donnelly, 156 Md. 81, 143 A. 648 (1928) (The
witness who has been impeached cannot testify as to his innocence, but
can be allowed to explain the circumstances of his offense, if in extenuation
of the act and in investigation of its effect-in discretion of the trial
court).
"However, of course you may put in evidence that bias does not exist,
or explain the circumstances. Under the American Law Institute's Code
(Rule 106) if the witness is biased against the person whom he testifies
for, such bias is relevant for the party.
754 WIGmoRE, EVIDENCE (3rd Ed., 1940) 181-2 Sec. 1108.7 6 Davis v. State, 38 Md. 15, 49 (1873).
77 4 WIooE, EVIDENCE (3rd Ed., 1940) Secs. 1122-1126.
78 Wigmore suggests that the prior consistent statement should be allowed
as proof that the prior inconsistent statement was not made, if that is in
issue. Ibid, Sec. 1126. However, consistent statements are usually only
allowed to rehabilitate.
79 See McAleer v. Horsey, 35 Md. 439, 467 (1872) (prior consistent state-
ment allowed after contradiction by another witness) (dissent, 35 Md.
468), cf. Maitland vs. Citizens' National Bank, 40 Md. 540 (1874) ; Cross v.
19431
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If the witness has been impeached for bias, interest, or
corruption, rehabilitation by prior consistent statement
should be allowed if the bias, etc., occurred after the state-
ment, as obviously the statement tends to disprove the in-
ference to be made from the bias. If impeachment is based
on a recent contrivance, i. e., the witness' testimony has
undergone radical change since last interviewed, prior con-
sistent statements are usually allowed;80 and some courts
allow prior consistent conduct where the witness has iden-
tified the defendant at a prior time."1
CONCLUSION
Impeachment and rehabilitation of witnesses in its pres-
ent state represents a transitional myriad of evil and good.
Generally speaking there is no great, crying need for re-
form, except perhaps as to impeachment of one's own wit-
ness. However, the law should know no place where unde-
sirable technicalities or obsolete rules cause injustice or
undue consumption of time and energy by courts and
suitors. Errors of both omission and commission should
be corrected-the rule against impeaching one's own wit-
ness, the rule of Queen's Case, the rules hampering char-
acter evidence, the too free use of the prior consistent
statements are among the especially undesirable. More-
over, with the relaxing or dispensing with such rules the
problem of relevancy which must be left to the trial judge
will become more acute. The time when the psychometrist
and the psychologist will be of great help in determining
the credibility of ordinary witnesses seems pretty remote.82
State, 118 Md. 660, 86 A. 223 (1912). This has been somewhat limited, by
Md. Code (1939) Art. 35, Sec. 3, parties to a cause may not thus be cor-
roborated unless the statement was in the adversary's presence.
Also the consistent statement may not be made too long after the act in
question, and the witness cannot be corroborated by statements he made
to which he testifies himself. For the general history of this doctrine see
American Stores Co. v. Herman, 166 Md. 312, 316-317, 171 A. 54 (1933).
8104 WiGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd Ed., 1940) Sec. 1129.
81 See Blake v. State, 157 Md. 75, 145 A. 185 (1929).
82 See 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (3rd Ed., 1940) Sees. 997-999a as to the
future of psychometry-scopolamine, the lie-detector, etc. Also see Ladd,
Techniques and Theory of Character Testimony (1939) 24 Iowa L. Rev.
498, 535; note, Scientific Gadgets in the Law of Evidence (1939) 53 Harv.
L. Rev. 285.
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As has been indicated throughout, the adoption of Rule 106
of the Code of Evidence is on the whole highly desirable.83
11 As to the adoption of the Code of Evidence generally see Morgan,
supra, n. 5, Wigmore, The American Law Institute Code of Evidence
Rules: A Dissent (1942) 28 A. B. A. J. 23. See also Niles, Comments on
Proposed Code, Baltimore Daily Record, March 30, 1942.
Rule 106: Evidence affecting credibility
(1) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3) of this Rule for the purpose of
impairing or supporting the credibility of a witness, any party in-
cluding the party calling him may:
(a) Examine him concerning any conduct by him and any other
matter of substantial probative value upon the issue of his credi-
bility as a witness, without being required, in examining him as
to a statement made by him in writing inconsistent with any
part of his testimony to show or read to him any part of the
writing; and
(b) Introduce other evidences of his conduct or of other matter
having substantial probative value, except that evidence of
traits of his character, other than honesty or veracity, or of his
commission or conviction of a crime not involving dishonesty or
false statement shall be inadmissible.
(2) The judge in his discretion may exclude evidence of a written or
oral statement of the witness offered under Paragraph (1)b of this
Rule unless the witness was so examined while testifying as to give
him an opportunity to deny or explain the statement.
(3) For the purpose of impairing the credibility of an accused in a crim-
inal action who testifies at a trial therein the accused shall not at
that trial be examined, nor shall any evidence be admitted, as to
facts tending to prove his commission or conviction of another crime,
unless he has first introduced evidence of his good character to
support his credibility.
